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CONTRACTS - THIRD p ARTY BENEFICIARY - POWER OF PROMISEE TO
DISCHARGE PROMISOR - NECESSITY FOR CONSIDERATION - Stanfield recovered judgment against W. C. McBride,'Inc. for personal injuries suffered in an
automobile accident which was occasioned by the negligence of Strunk, employee of the McBride company, who at the time of the accident was driving
(with the owner's consent) an automobile owned by the Miller-Morgan Auto
Company. The McBride company in turn recovered a judgment against its
employee, Strunk, and now as garnishor seeks to reach an insurance policy
issued to the Miller-Morgan company which at the time of its issuance contained an omnibus clause insuring all persons driving the insured car with the
consent of the Miller-Morgan company. However, prior to the accident a rider
had been attached to the policy cancelling the omnibus clause but leaving the
policy otherwise intact. The McBride company offered to show that tjlere was
no consideration to support the rider in order to recover on the policy as originallJ. issued. Held, that the promisor and promisee may by agreement change
the contract so that it no longer protects a third party beneficiary, not identifiable at the time, and that the third party beneficiary cannot raise the question
of want of consideration for the deletion of the omnibus clause. Stanfield v.

W. C. McBride, Inc., 149 Kan. 567, 88 P. (2d) 1002 (1939).1
The principal case raises two distinct questions. The first is whether or not
the promisee and promisor may discharge, vary or rescind their contract by
agreement in such a manner as to extinguish the rights of a third party beneficiary. In determining this question our courts have usually drawn no distinction
between the situations of donee beneficiaries and creditor beneficiaries/ though

l An action is now pending on these facts in the United States District Court for
Kansas upon the theory that the Kansas court in the principal case was deciding only
that garnishment pleadings did not properly raise the question of consideration. For the
purpose of this note the other possible interpretation of the opinion is taken, that a rule
of Jaw is being laid down.
2 In general, 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 396 B et seq. (1936);
l CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 133 (1932).
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in principle there would seem to be considerable difference. Clearly, if the third
party is a creditor of the promisee and if the rendition of performance to him
is intended to discharge the debt of the promisee, the promisor's duty 'to perform may be viewed as an asset of the promisee. Consequently any disposition
of this asset by the promisee, as by discharge or variation, should be treated in
the same manner as the disposition of any other asset of the debtor. Thus, if
there is nothing which constitutes an estoppel against discharge, and if the elements of a fraud on creditors may not be made out, the creditor beneficiary
should have no right to object to the discharge of the contract by the promisee.s
On the other hand, a donee beneficiary is in quite a different situation. Indeed
he is perilously close to the position of a mere volunteer, having presumably
given no value even in the sense that a creditor beneficiary has. This £act in
some jurisdictions has led to the view that a gift beneficiary acquires no rights
under the contract to which he is not a party.4 Survival of this idea may in part
account for the doctrine that a donee beneficiary's rights are subject to be extinguished by the promisee and promiser.5 However, such a position seems
inconsistent with current and well-established theories concerning the nature
of the rights of contract beneficiaries.6 In a matured system of law such as ours
it ought not to be necessary to resort to fictions such as trust;z· novation,8 agency,°
or subrogation,10 which often are employed to justify the results reached in
creditor-beneficiary cases. So, also, the view that the donee beneficiary may be
barred by an agreement of the promisee and promiser entered into prior to the
time he assents to the contract 11 is equally unsatisfactory. Such assent at most
supplies only fictional privity of contract. In the analogous case of a gift of
personal property, assent is presumed and the gift is irrevocable in the absence
of a disclaimer. While this analogy has not been universally accepted, it seems
3 2 Wu.L1sToN, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 397 (1936); l CoNTRACTS RESTATEM,ENT, § 143 (1932); Clark & Co. v. Nelson, 216 Ala. 199, n2 So. 819 (1927).
Contra, Starbird v. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 P. 652 (1897).
4 Carolus v. Arkansas Light & Power Co., 164 Ark. 507, 262 S. W. 330 (1924);
Jefferson v. Asch, 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604 (1893); Fulford v. Cleveland, 55
S. D. 509, 260 N. W. 739 (1929). Cf. the practice of allowing the creditor-beneficiary
to secure enforcement by a creditor's bill, Forbes v. Thorpe, 209 Mass. 570, 95 N. E.
955 (19u), and the "close relationship" theory, Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233,
120 N. E. 639 (1918) (which extended the theory so far as practically to destroy it
as a limitation).
:; Plott v. Kittelson, 58 N. D. 881, 228 N. W. 217 (1929); People's Bank &
Trust Co. v. Weidinger, 73 N. J. L. 433, 64 A. 179 (1906).
6 1 CoNTRAcTs RESTATEMENT, §§ 135, 136, 142-143 (1932); 2 W1LLJSTON,
CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 396 et seq. (1936). Contra, Page, "The Power of the Contracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person,"
12 W1s •.L. REv. 141 (1937).
7 Moore v. Darton, 4 De G. & S. 517, 64 Eng. Rep. 938 (1851), where the
facts indicate clearly a loan to be repaid to a third person.
8 Wood v. Moriarty, 15 R. I: 518, 9 A. 427 (1887).
9 Concurring opinions in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 at 275 (1859); 81
A. L. R. 1271 at 1283 (1932).
10 Hubard & Appleby v. Thacker, 132 Va. 33, no S. E. 263 (1922).
11 Etscheid v. Baker, n2 Wis. 129, 88 N. W. 52 (1901).
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fairly applicable to the cases in which the beneficiary is definitely known or
ascertainable.12 However, the principal case presents the situation in which the
beneficiary is not identifiable at the time of the change and may never become
so. In such a case it may be fair·to hold that the parties to the contract may
alter it so long as the beneficiary is unascertainable.13 There still remains, however, the second question raised in the principal case. Assuming that the promisee
and promisor may by agreement change the contract so as to prevent the accrual
of rights to the third party, what standards will be applied in determining
whether or not an effective change has been made? It is generally agreed that
when a promise, valid in all respects as to the promisee, exists to render performance to a third person, then that person has a right to enforce the promise.14
So, it has been held that a beneficiary may show that a change was void, if,
when it was made, the promisee was incompetent.15 Likewise, though the
beneficiary was unascertainable at the time of a purported rescission of the contract, he has been allowed to show that recission was obtained by fraud and to
recover despite the fraudulent cancellation.16 Similarly the beneficiary has been
allowed to show that the contract actually made between the parties was different from the integration, in which it was embodied, as a basis for reformation
and recovery on the contract as reformed.11 These cases seem to illustrate the
proposition, which the writer thinks is desirable, and with which the decision in
the principal case is inconsistent-i.e., if the promise would be presently enforceable by the promisee the third party is entitled to enforce it, despite a
purported change.
R oy L • R agers

12 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 397 (1936). Copeland v. Beard, 217 Ala.
:z.16, II5 So. 389 (1928); Waterman v. Morgan, II4 Ind. 237, 16 N. E. 590
(1887); Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, n6 Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 440 (1903), which is

apparently applicable to either donee or creditor cases. But contra is Plott v. Kittelson,
58 N. D. 881, 228 N. W. 217 {1929), and see also contra, Page, "The Power of the
Contracting Parties to After a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person,"

12 Wis. L. REV. 141 (1937).
13 The Michigan statute of 1937 specifically so provides. Mich. Pub. Acts {1937),
No. 296, § 3.
H In general, see 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 356 et seq. (1936);
also, Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, no Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 440 (1903).
15 Sluder v. National Americans, 101 Kan. 320, 166 P. 482 {1917); McMurtray
v. McMurtray, 67 Okla. 50, 168 P. 422 (1917).
16 Riddle v. Rankin, 146 Kan. 316, 69 P. (2d) 722 (1937). Surely if the third
party may, in effect, exercise an election to avoid, there should be no difficulty when
the change is void rather than merely voidable.
17 Tuzinska v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 241 App. Div. 598, 272

N. Y. S. 593 (1934).

